Learning from model diagnostics that a prior distribution must be replaced by one that conflicts less with the data raises the question of which prior should be used for inference and decision. The same problem arises when a decision maker learns that one or more reliable experts express unexpected beliefs.
Introduction
As idealized agents, Bayesian decision makers minimize expected loss with respect to a distribution according to a Bayesian model that, in the usual statistics setting, includes a prior probability distribution P and a sampling model consisting of a family {f (•|θ) : θ ∈ Θ} of probability functions, where Θ is the parameter space. If x is the observed value of X ∼ f (•|θ) with θ ∼ P , then Bayes's rule minimizes the expected loss with respect to the posterior probability distribution P (•|x).
A persistent problem in Bayesian statistics and decision making is that posed by an unexpected insight that requires revision of the prior distribution. The insight here goes beyond the observation that X = x and may include machine learning. An artificial agent perceives a surprising report from one or more experts.
A statistician perceives diagnostics indicating that P is obviously inadequate in light of its conflict with x or with other data. A physician perceives through reflection a new way to look at a puzzling disease. How should these agents proceed given the constraints their insights impose on the prior?
Suppose such a new insight requires a change in the prior to one in some set Γ of priors that are in some sense more adequate for inferential and decision-making purposes. The insight only constrains the new prior to the adequate set without in itself indicating one adequate prior over another. Expected loss is now to be minimized with respect to one of the posterior distributions corresponding to one of the priors in Γ. Which should be used for inference and decision? Example 1. A decision maker (DM) held beliefs about the value of θ that were represented by P until becoming convinced to replace it with a prior probability distribution in the closed convex hull Γ of the prior distributions that represent the beliefs of domain experts. The DM lacks the time needed to formulate from scratch a model treating the experts' priors as observations and thus cannot apply the Bayesian methods reviewed in Cooke (1991, pp. 176-184 ). An alternative is that the DM does not have the resources to elicit the precise prior distribution of any expert but only some closed convex set Γ of probability mass functions generated from eliciting the relevant buying and selling prices that reflect beliefs held by a single expert (Augustin et al., 2014, Prop. 1.6 ). In either case, the DM needs to know which probability distribution in Γ to use for computing the expected loss of each contemplated action.
A DM who does not consider the m experts equally reliable as sources of information about θ may assign the ith prior a weight λ i . The DM then has the insight that the prior suitable for decisions is in the closed convex hull of the priors meeting a minimal adequacy α, that is, Γ (α) = clco {P i : λ i ≥ α} .
Example 2. Let X ∼ N θ, σ 2 denote a sample of n independent normal observations of unknown mean θ and known standard deviation σ. The prior distribution of θ is N µ 0 , σ 2 0 . The posterior distribution of θ is P µ0 (•|X = x) = N µ µ0 (x) , σ 2 (x) , wherex is the observed sample mean, µ µ0 (x) = µ 0 + nxσ 
where x andx are the observed sample and its mean, andX prior is the random sample mean of n independent observations drawn from the prior predictive distribution (Bickel, 2015a) . In this case, p x (µ 0 ) is equal to the calibrated posterior predictive p value of Hjort et al. (2006) .
Rather than only considering p x (3.5), the p value checking the initial prior distribution P = N 3.5, σ 2 0 (see Walter and Augustin, 2009) , the statistician has the insight that the prior distribution is constrained to the closed convex hull of its observed 100 (1 − α) % confidence set, an example of an α-adequate set of prior distributions (Bickel, 2015b) :
Examples 1 and 2 respectively present subjectively assigned weights and prior-predictive p values as straightforward quantities for generating adequate sets of prior distributions for inference in light of an insight.
Adequate sets can alternatively be defined using posterior-predictive p values, Bayes factors, likelihood ratios, proper scoring rules, or other algorithmic means of model assessment or may be specified by human judgment rather than by any formal rule (Bickel, 2015b, §2 .2, §A.1). Another possible measure of the adequacy of a prior is how weakly informative it is (see Evans, 2015) . Regardless of how a set of distributions comes to be regarded as more adequate than the initial distribution, the problem of subsequent inference and decision remains.
One solution is to apply decision rules from imprecise probability and robust Bayes theory (Bickel, 2015b, §3.2.2, §A.2.2) . Unfortunately, rules of that type can lead to inconsistencies in actions that could be avoided if there were only one posterior distribution (Elga, 2010) . That suggests combining the prior distributions in Γ into a single distribution for purposes of inference and action (Bickel, 2015b, §3.2 .1, §A.2.1).
While the combination of distributions may be simple, non-Bayesian methods of combination often run into inconsistencies similar to those of Elga (2010) .
This paper presents a general Bayesian solution to the problem of inference and decision after the insight constraining the prior to Γ. Without requiring large samples, this solution takes advantage of the Gibbs conditioning principle from the theory of large deviations (e.g. Dembo and Zeitouni, 2009 ). Mathematically stated as various conditional limit theorems (e.g., Cover and Thomas, 2006) , it says a conditional probability distribution, given that an empirical distribution is in Γ, approaches the distribution that minimizes the entropy over Γ relative to the initial distribution. Like the approach of Skyrms (1985) , this solution moves in the opposite direction as those deriving conditional probability from minimizing the relative entropy. For the latter direction, see Williams (1980) and Paris (1994, pp. 119-120) on discrete distributions and Diaconis and Zabell (1982) , Caticha and Giffin (2006) , and Harremoës (2007, Exa. 3) for more general proofs. These approaches, like those based on general classes of loss functions (e.g., Grünwald and Dawid, 2004) , do not uniquely lead to minimizing relative entropy (Diaconis and Zabell, 1982) .
Section 2 departs from previous Bayesian applications of large-deviation theory (Csiszár, 1985; Grendar Jr. and Grendar, 2004; Halpern, 2003, §11.5) chiefly by distinguishing the sample size, which remains finite, from the large-deviation distribution index, which diverges. This is accomplished by noting that distributions are equivalent for inferential purposes if they may be made arbitrarily close to each other without requiring additional data. Such distributions are practically equivalent in that they yield the same actions when minimizing expected loss.
Based on the notion of practical equivalence with Bayesian conditionalization, this version of minimizing relative entropy (a) complies with the insight that the prior lies in Γ, (b) retains the initial prior in the degenerate case in which nothing new was learned from the insight, and (c) commutes with updating a prior to a posterior, as seen in Section 3. While the first two results resemble those in the literature on desirable properties of maximum entropy (e.g., Shore and Johnson, 1980; Csiszár, 1991; Paris, 1994, pp. 120-122; Caticha and Giffin, 2006; Baez and Fritz, 2014) , the third holds for the large-deviation version under broader conditions than the affine-constraint condition required to guarantee the commutativity of the more direct version of minimizing relative entropy (Williams, 1980; Csiszár, 1991) . Other widely used approaches either suffer from a lack of coherence in the strict Bayesian sense or fail to satisfy the featured properties of minimizing relative entropy. First, the arithmetic average of adequate distributions fails to depend on the original prior, replacing it even when it satisfies all the constraints imposed by the insight.
Second, the normalized geometric average of distributions is not in general a member of the set of adequate distributions being combined. When that average of adequate distributions is not itself adequate, it is incompatible with the constraints the new insight places on the prior. Some shortcomings are overcome by Bayesian model averaging, given a hyperprior over the priors in Γ, the set of adequate distributions. That, however, can fail to retain the initial prior when it already satisfies the constraint imposed by the insight.
Those problems with the above methods of inference on the basis of Γ stem from ignoring the considerable information available in P , the initial prior distribution.
An idealization involved in the proposed method of minimum-relative-entropy updating is the sharp distinction between adequacy and inadequacy on the basis of the choice of the adequacy threshold. 2 Inference given an insight about the prior
Preliminary concepts
Consider a metric space Θ and the measurable spaces (Θ, F Θ ) and (X , F X ), where Θ is called a parameter space and X a sample space. For example, X = R n if x is a vector sample of n real observations.
For any set Ω, let P Ω denote a metric space of all probability measures on a measurable space (Ω, F Ω ) and
C Ω the set of all bounded continuous real-valued functions on Ω. P Θ is endowed with the narrow topology (Crauel, 2002) defined as the topology generated by the family of open sets of the form Dudley, 2002, p. 40) . A sequence of probability measures {P N : N = 1, 2, . . . } in P Θ is said to weakly converge to a probability measure
for all h Θ ∈ C Θ (e.g., Billingsley, 1999) .
For every θ ∈ Θ, consider F θ as a different distribution in P X , and f θ = dF θ /dη as the Radon-Nikodym derivative of F θ with respect to a measure η that dominates
Fix the decision space D as the set of possible decisions. A bounded continuous loss function on Θ and
The set of all such functions is denoted by
The Bayesian updating rule is stated as a map transforming a prior distribution.
Definition 1. For any prior distribution P ∈ P Θ , the posterior distribution given the observation that
x ∈ X , denoted by P (•|X = x), is the distribution in P Θ such that, for any H ∈ F Θ ,
The conditionalization on X = x is the map u x : P Θ → P Θ equal to P (•|X = x) of equation (3) as a function of P , that is, P → u x (P ) = P (•|X = x). Abusing the notation, the map u x : P PΘ → P PΘ satisfying
is also a conditionalization on X = x, where X ∼ f θ and θ ∼ Q.
Thus, the conditionalization on X = x is the function that transforms a prior distribution to a posterior distribution according to Bayes's theorem. Consider an index N = 1, 2, . . . , that, unlike the sample size n, may be increased at will until achieving the desired precision.
Lemma 1. If P 1 , P 2 , . . . and P ∞ are probability measures in P Θ such that
for all h Θ ∈ C Θ and x ∈ X .
Proof.
where
. By the definition of weak convergence,
Practical equivalence and coherent updating
Revising the prior is equivalent to revising the posterior under the working assumption that the sampling model remains unchanged. An equivalence relation formalizes the idea that prior probability distributions are in practice equivalent for purposes of data analysis if they yield arbitrarily close prior and posterior expected losses.
Definition 2. A sequence {P N : N = 1, 2, . . . } of probability measures in P Θ is practically equivalent to a
for every ∆ ∈ D. Two sequences of probability measures in P Θ are practically equivalent to each other if each is practically equivalent to the same probability measure in P Θ .
Recall that N is arbitrarily large without requiring any additional data. Weak convergence is necessary and sufficient for practical equivalence.
Lemma 2. A sequence {P N : N = 1, 2, . . . } of probability measures in P Θ weakly converges to a probability measure P ∞ ∈ P Θ if and only if {P N : N = 1, 2, . . . } is practically equivalent to P ∞ .
The following statements hold for every ∆ ∈ D and every ∈ C Θ,D .
Since the function ∆ on Θ that is defined by θ → ∆ (θ) = (θ, ∆) is continuous, bounded, and real-valued, the definition of weak convergence yields
establishing equation (5). Similarly, equation (6) The concept of coherently learning from a new insight distinguishes between, on one hand, the conditioning that updates the prior given the new insight about which priors are adequate and, on the other hand, the conditioning on x that transforms a prior to a posterior.
Definition 3. Consider a set G ⊂ F PΘ of possible adequate sets of prior distributions, each of which consists of probability distributions on (Θ, F Θ ). The sequence {Q N,P : N = 1, 2, . . . } of probability measures in P PΘ , is a coherent updater of P under G if Q N,P meets these conditions:
1. Pre-updating equivalence. The sequence π (•) dQ N,P (π) : N = 1, 2, . . . of mixture distributions is practically equivalent to P .
2. Updating equivalence. For every Γ ∈ G, the sequence
of conditional distributions is practically equivalent to some distribution P Γ ∈ P Θ , which is called the coherent update of P under Γ and {Q N,P : N = 1, 2, . . . }.
Every sequence of distributions in P Θ that is practically equivalent to a coherent update of P under Γ is itself a coherent update of P under Γ.
The main idea is that coherence between the initial prior and the insight that inference should instead be based on a more adequate prior is achieved by introducing the coherent updater. By definition, it agrees with the initial prior distribution and posterior distribution when disregarding the insight (Condition 1) and yet, conditional on the insight that only the prior distributions in Γ are adequate, also agrees with with the coherent update's prior distribution and its posterior distribution (Condition 2). With Lemma 2, Conditions 1 and 2 may be abbreviated as π (•) dQ N,P (π)
..,θ N ) would be the empirical distribution, but the type is only considered here as a mathematical device.
The following result says updating a sequence by conditioning on a constraint on the type is coherent.
Lemma 3. For any P ∈ P Θ , let P N denote the distribution of the vector (θ 1 , . . . , θ N ), where θ 1 , . . . , θ N ∼ P are independent. Consider a nonempty Γ ∈ F PΘ . Assume that the sequence L N,P,Γ : N = 1, 2, . . . that is defined by the mixture distribution
exists and weakly converges to some distributionL ∞,P,Γ on (Θ, F Θ ). ThenL ∞,P,Γ is a coherent update of P under Γ.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary function
for all L ∈ F PΘ and N = 1, 2, . . . , and letπ
Thus, by the weak law of large numbers and the invariance of L (θ1,...,θ N ) to permutations of θ 1 , . . . , θ N (Harremoës, 2007, pp. 140-141) ,
Since h Θ is arbitrary, it follows that {π N : N = 1, 2 . . . } weakly converges to P , which with Lemma 2 establishes the practical equivalence of {π N : N = 1, 2 . . . } to P . That means Condition 1 of Definition 3 is met.
Similarly,
Thus, {π N,Γ : N = 1, 2, . . . } weakly converges toL ∞,P,Γ , satisfying Condition 2 of Definition 3 according to Lemma 2 and thereby provingL ∞,P,Γ to be a coherent update of P .
Coherence of minimum relative entropy
For any P , P ∈ P Θ , the Kullback-Leibler divergence between them or the entropy of P relative to P is
if P is absolutely continuous with respect to P but D (P || P ) = ∞ otherwise (e.g., Rassoul-Agha and Seppäläinen, 2015, p. 68). Any distribution P Γ ∈ P Θ is a minimum-relative-entropy distribution over some nonempty Γ ∈ F PΘ relative to a P ∈ P Θ if
The term maximum entropy is also used in this context, having originated from the proportionality of −D (P || P ) to Shannon entropy in the case that Θ is finite and P is the uniform distribution on Θ, 2 Θ .
Theorem 1. If Γ ∈ F PΘ is closed, convex, and of non-empty interior int Γ such that
then P Γ , the minimum-relative-entropy distribution over Γ relative to P , exists, is unique, and is a coherent update of P under the adequate set Γ. Further,
. . , θ N ) ∼ P N , weakly converges to δ P Γ , the Dirac measure on (P Θ , F PΘ ) with support at P Γ .
Proof. From the stated conditions, Rassoul-Agha and Seppäläinen (2015, pp. 79-80) used the convexity of P → D (P || P ) to prove the existence and uniqueness of the maximum entropy distribution P Γ and used Sanov's theorem from large deviation theory and the portmanteau theorem to prove:
for all h Θ ∈ C Θ .
2. Q N,P (•|Γ)
Using the invariance of L (θ1,...,θ N ) to permutations of θ 1 , . . . , θ N (Harremoës, 2007, pp. 140-141) , equation (10) establishes that L N,P,Γ : N = 1, 2, . . . , as defined by equation (7), also weakly converges to P Γ , abbreviated byL N,P,Γ weak − −− → P Γ . Thus, by Lemma 3, P Γ is a coherent update of P .
Example 3. Theorem 1 applies to Example 2 since its Γ (α; x) satisfies int Γ (α; x) = ∅ and is a closed convex set of distributions (2) with finite relative entropy from the initial prior distribution, P = N 3.5, σ 2 0 . By equation (1),
where CDFx is the distribution function of N x, σ 2 /n + σ 2 0 , which originates from N µ 0 , σ 2 /n + σ 2 0 as the law ofX prior (Bickel, 2015a) .
Comparisons to other updating methods

Updating methods
Recalling G from Definition 3, an updater of the initial prior P is a sequence Q N,P of probability measures on (P Θ , F PΘ ) that is equipped with an updating method, a function v • (•) : G × P PΘ → P PΘ that transforms a constraint set Γ ∈ G and each member of the updater to a probability measure on (P Θ , F PΘ ). If
. . is practically equivalent to some P Γ ∈ P Θ , then P Γ is called the
For example, the coherent updater {Q N,P : N = 1, 2, . . . } of Definition 3 is an updater equipped with the updating method
which generates the coherent update as the update. That (Γ,
Other methods of combining distributions (Genest and Zidek, 1986 ) also qualify as updating methods even though they do not depend on P . A simple updater is the constant sequence {λ : N = 1, 2, . . . } equipped with this generalization of the linear opinion pool (McConway, 1981) :
where λ is a probability measure on (P Θ , F PΘ ). The corresponding generalization of the m-expert logarithmic opinion pool (McConway, 1981; uses the constant updater {δ P : N = 1, 2, . . . } equipped with the updating method
is the Dirac measure on (P Θ , F PΘ ) with support at P log Γ , π i is the ith of the m probability distributions in Γ corresponding to expert opinions, and λ i ∈ [0, 1] is its weight 1,...,m λ i = 1 . An updater {Q N,P : N = 1, 2, . . . } equipped with an updating method v • (•) minimizes the relative entropy if v Γ (Q N,P ) is practically equivalent to δ P Γ for all Γ ∈ G, with δ P Γ defined as in Theorem 1.
The simplest example is the direct version of minimizing relative entropy, in which the constant updater {δ P : N = 1, 2, . . . } is equipped with the updating method
Desirable properties of an updating method are invariance to the order in which information is processed ( §3.2), agreement with the insight that the adequate priors are in Γ ( §3.3), and agreement with the initial prior P when P ∈ Γ ( §3.4). All properties describe the version of minimum relative entropy derived from large-deviation theory ( §3.5) as opposed to the version in equation (15).
Commutativity between observations and insights
An important property of a method of updating a prior is that it not depend on whether the new insight about which priors are adequate is applied before or after conditioning on the observation x to transform a prior distribution to a posterior distribution. This commutativity property requires that the insight-updated posterior is practically equivalent to the posterior corresponding to an insight-updated prior.
Let {Q N,P : N = 1, 2, . . . } denote an updater equipped with some v • (•) as its updating method. In
Commutativity is satisfied by the direct minimization of relative entropy (15) if and only if
according to equation (4). This notion of commutativity thus reduces in this case to the u x (P Γ ) = (u x (P )) Γ proven to hold under affine constraints (Csiszár, 1991) , which are stronger than the requirement that Γ be closed and convex (Williams, 1980) . Likewise, the logarithmic opinion pool (14) satisfies commutativity if and only if
log Γ , which is met under broad conditions . While the linear opinion pool (13) (Genest and Zidek, 1986) , it nonetheless generally commutes with conditionalization:
Insight-receptive updating
A method of updating a prior in light of the insight that the adequate priors are in Γ should result in a prior lying in Γ for all practical purposes. Accordingly, an updating method v • (•) is insight-receptive if P Γ ∈ Limpts Γ for all Γ ∈ G, where P Γ is the update from v • (•), and Limpts Γ is the set of all limit points of Γ. For example, the linear opinion pool (13) is insight-receptive given the convexity of Γ. The policy of retaining the initial prior P even when P / ∈ Limpts Γ is obviously not insight-receptive.
That the logarithmic opinion pool can also fail to be insight-receptive is seen from a counterexample.
Example 4. Applying the updating method of equation (14) to Example 1, suppose Θ = {0, 1, 2}, m = 2, π 1 ({0}) = π 2 ({0}) = 1 /3, π 1 ({1}) = 0, π 2 ({1}) = 2 /3, π 1 ({2}) = 2 /3, π 2 ({2}) = 0, λ 1 = λ 2 = 1 /2, and Γ = clco {π 1 , π 2 }, which is the closed convex hull of π 1 and π 2 . Combining the two distributions that each assigns probability 1 /3 to θ = 0 yields a very different probability that θ = 0:
Prior-persistent updating
A method of updating a prior in light of the insight that the adequate priors are in Γ should retain the initial prior P if P ∈ Γ since the insight provides no new information. As Paris (2014) Q N,P for all N = 1, 2, . . . and P ∈ Γ. This rules out all updating methods that do not depend on the initial prior P , including the linear opinion pool defined by equation (13) (Paris, 2014, p. 6191) , the logarithmic opinion pool defined by equation (14), and the usual approaches to Bayesian model averaging.
Satisfaction of commutativity, insight-receptiveness and prior-persistence
The next result says prior persistence, insight-receptiveness, and commutativity are weaker than practical coherence, which is weaker than minimizing relative entropy.
Theorem 2. If G is a class of the closed, convex sets in F PΘ that are of non-empty interior and that
is a coherent updating method, then it is prior-persistent and insight-receptive, and it commutes with the conditionalization u x for any x ∈ X .
..,θ N ) ∈ Γ and under the stated assumptions about G, Theorem 1 indicates that (Γ, Q N,P ) → v Γ (Q N,P ) both is practically equivalent to P Γ and is a coherent updating method.
For the other results not requiring those assumptions about G, consider any P ∈ P Θ and Γ ∈ G and any coherent updating method (Γ, Q N,P ) → v Γ (Q N,P ) and its coherent update v Γ (P ) = P Γ (see Definition 3).
In terms of Definition 2, P →π N,P := π (•) dQ N,P (π), and P →π N,P,Γ := π (•) dQ N,P (π|Γ), Conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 3 state the following for any ∈ C Θ,D and ∆ ∈ D:
If P ∈ Γ, then the definition ofπ N,P,Γ as a mixture of π with respect to a conditional distribution given π ∈ Γ implies that
by equation (16). A comparison with equation (17) then indicates that
Equation (17) also establishes insight-receptiveness:π N,P,Γ ∈ Γ for all N = 1, 2, . . . with the practical equivalence ofπ N,P,Γ and P Γ implies that P Γ ∈ Limpts Γ.
By equations (4) and (12),
from which it follows that every coherent updating method (Γ, Q N,P ) → v Γ (Q N,P ) commutes with conditionalization.
4 Inference given an uncertain insight about a prior
Extension of coherent updating to uncertain insights
The concept of coherent updating given an adequate set of priors generalizes to coherent updating given a distribution of such sets of distributions in P Θ . This generalization applies when the adequate set of priors is not known with certainty.
Definition 4. Let F G denote a σ-field of subsets of G and G a probability distribution on the measurable space (G, F G ). The distributionP G ∈ P Θ is a coherent update of a prior distribution P ∈ P Θ under G if there is a function P → {Q N,P : N = 1, 2, . . . } that meets Condition 1 of Definition 3 (pre-updating equivalence) and this generalization of Condition 2:
• Updating equivalence. The sequence π (•) dQ N,P (π|Γ) dG (Γ) : N = 1, 2, . . . of mixtures of conditional distributions is practically equivalent toP G .
Conditioning on a random set also has frequentist applications (e.g., Couso et al., 2014, p. 30) .
Proposition 1. If P Γ is a coherent update of a prior distribution P ∈ P Θ under the adequate set Γ for all
is a coherent update of P under any distribution
By Lemma 2 and Definition 3,
satisfying the pre-updating equivalence condition of Definition 4 according to Lemma 2. Analogous steps establish satisfaction of the updating equivalence condition:
The special case of averaging a maximum entropy distribution over the distribution of a quantity in a linear constraint was rejected by Jaynes (1989) but recommended by Cheeseman and Stutz (2005) .
Set estimation for coherent updating
Uncertain insights based on adequate sets
A random adequate set may be simplified by making it a function of a random level of adequacy and of the observed data. For some real number α in an interval A and for an observation y that may differ from x, a set Γ (α; y) of prior distributions is a prior α-adequate constraint set if it consists of the closed convex hull of a prior α-adequate set, the prior distributions with some data-dependent measure of adequacy of at least α:
Γ (α; y) = clco {P ∈ P Θ : a (P ; y) ≥ α} ,
where P → a (P ; y) is a real-valued function on P Θ . Data-dependent measures of adequacy include Bayesian p values, proper scoring rules, Bayes factors, and likelihood ratios (Bickel, 2015b) . A random scalar A then defines the distribution G by Γ (A; y) ∼ G.
Proposition 1 says the coherent update of P is
equation (18) following from
since coherent updating methods are prior-persistent (Theorem 2). P Γ(α;y) (•) by definition minimizes the divergence over Γ (α; y) with respect to P (•).
While using different data for checking the prior and for moving from the prior to the posterior (x = y) would seem ideal, it is often not feasible in practice (Bickel, 2015b) . Thus, y := x in the remainder of the paper without loss of generality.
Sets with specified coverage probabilities
Choosing U (0, 1) as the distribution of the threshold A is a natural default when 1 − α is a probability that P ∈ Γ (α; X) for a fixed prior P or a probability that π ∈ Γ (α; x) for a random prior π according to a hierarchical model. That coverage probability 1 − α may be the confidence level, fiducial probability, or posterior probability with Γ (α; X) as a confidence set, with Γ (α; x) as a fiducial set, or with Γ (α; x) as a Bayesian credible set, respectively. In any case, the uncertain adequate set corresponding to the observation x is Γ (A; x), where either A ∼ U (0, 1), by default, or the distribution of A models the betting policy of a real or hypothetical agent. The default is a special case of the randomized closed sets of Nguyen (2006, §5.2) , provided that Γ (α; x) is upper semicontinuous (see Bickel, 2015b, §2.1) . It simplifies equation (18) to
The confidence-set case arises from measuring adequacy by a prior predictive p value:
where t P (•) : X → R transforms the data to the statistic used to check prior distribution P . Thus, p X (P ) ∼ U (0, 1) when sampling from the prior (i.e., θ ∼ P and X ∼ f θ ). It follows that
is a (1 − α) 100% confidence set for P in the sense that
for any P ∈ P Θ and α ∈ [0, 1] (Bickel, 2015a). The same applies to the calibrated posterior predictive p values of Hjort et al. (2006) since they follow equation (20) for some function t P (•). The α-adequate constraint set in this case is the closed convex set Γ (α; x) = clco P (α; x).
Example 5. Applying A ∼ U (0, 1) to Examples 2 and 3, substituting P Γ(α;x) (•) from equation (11) into Figure 1 : Normal-normal prior distribution functions of the normal mean θ, in order of increasing line thickness and lightness: initial prior distribution (P ); prior conditional on a constraint fixed at the α = 1%
significance level P Γ(0.01;x) ; prior conditional on a constraint fixed at the α = 5% significance level P Γ(0.05;x) ; prior conditional on a random constraint (P G ). The sample mean increases from left to right:
x = 4 in the left panel, where P = P Γ(0.01;x) = P Γ(0.05;x) ;x = 4.8 in the center panel, where P = P Γ(0.01;x) ; x = 5 in the right panel. The vertical line is at µ 0 = 3.5, the mean of the initial prior, P .
equation (19), with p x (3.5) = p x N 3.5, σ 2 0 , yields
and similarly for π x < . Figure 1 displays the distribution functions of P , and P Γ(0.01;x) , P Γ(0.05;x) , and P G usingx = 4.8, 5 and these settings from Bickel (2015b,a) However, 0.01 < p x (3.5) = 0.02 < 0.05 whenx = 4.8 (center panel) and p x (3.5) = 6 × 10 −3 < 0.01 when
Remark 1. Since a (P ; x) = p x (P ), equation (19) treats the p value of P as the prior probability that θ ∼ P .
By contrast, a fiducial argument leads to treating a p value as a posterior probability that a null hypothesis is true rather than the prior probability. That argument leads to making inferences and decisions on the basis of
where Π x 0 and Π x 1 are coherent fiducial distributions, probability measures derived from confidence distributions, and p x 0 is a p value testing a hypothesis consistent with the sole use of Π x 0 (Bickel and Padilla, 2014) . That fiducial approach conflicts with the present default approach if p
0 is a fiducial posterior probability that θ ∼ Π x 0 , whereas p x (P ) is a prior probability in equation (19).
Integrated likelihood sets
For α ≤ 0, an α-adequate integrated likelihood set,
has been proposed for determining which priors conflict with x (Bickel, 2015b) . A case of this P (α; x) for non-Bayesian inference was suggested by Fisher (1973, pp. 75-76 ) with 2 α = 1/2, 1/5, 1/15 and with the equivalent of each P a Dirac measure at a different value of θ. The corresponding α-adequate constraint set is the convex closure Γ (α; x) = clco P (α; x).
The choice of a distribution for A for conditioning on the insight that P ∈ Γ (A; y) may be guided by the following considerations. An α-adequate integrated likelihood set is considered unreliable if P (α; X) has a high probability of failing to include a fixed prior distribution P under θ ∼ P and X ∼ f θ . That probability is the probability of a misleading insight, P (α) = Prob θ∼P ,X∼f θ P / ∈ P (α; X) ,
which is a model-checking generalization of the probability of observing misleading evidence defined by Bickel (2012) . That probability is itself a composite-hypothesis extension of the probability of observing misleading likelihood-ratio evidence defined by Royall (2000) and developed by Blume (2008) and others. Baskurt (2014) , following Royall and Tsou (2003) , considers satisfaction of an upper bound on the latter probability as a necessary property that a pseudolikelihood ratio must possess to be a valid measure of statistical evidence (cf. Bickel, 2013, §3.2) .
In the simple case corresponding to current practice, A ∼ δ α for some value α, perhaps −3 , −5, or −7 (Bickel, 2015b) , with the result that the insight is that P ∈ Γ (α; y) almost surely. While agreeing with the likelihood principle, that approach is not reliable for all models and sample sizes. It would be considered reliable if P (α) is less than 0.01, 0.05, another conventional value, or the upper bound mentioned above.
Otherwise, the analysis could be postponed until additional data arrive, but if that is not practical, α may have to be lowered (Hodge et al., 2011) . This suggests a two-stage approach:
1. Check whether the specified likelihood-ratio threshold 2 α is low enough that the misleading adequacy probability (α, P ) is below some threshold such as 0.05.
2. If so, the insight is that Γ (α; y) is the adequate set of prior distributions for application of Theorem 1. Otherwise, return to Stage 1 with a lower value of α.
Likelihood-confidence sets
The two-stage approach of Section 4.2. A comparison with equation (22) demonstrates that the likelihood set P −1 P (α ) ; X is a (1 − α ) 100% confidence set for P . In fact, P −1 P (α ) ; X = P (α ; X), where P (α ; X) is the α -adequate confidence set of equation (21) with the likelihood-ratio test statistic
in equation (20) to define the prior predictive p value for testing the null hypothesis that the prior is P . Section 4.2.2 indicates the natural default adequate set is P −1 P (A) ; x = P (A; X) with A ∼ U (0, 1).
The special case in which P Θ is a set of Dirac measures on Θ makes further connections to earlier work. First, reliance on the significance level α rather than on the likelihood-ratio threshold α provides the calibration that some models require for good frequentist performance (see Kalbfleisch (2000) and Severini (2000, p. 102) ). Second, Γ (α ; X), as both a likelihood set and a confidence set, is called a likelihoodconfidence set after the likelihood-confidence interval studied by Sprott (2000, §5. 3). Third, a large-sample limit of the t P -based prior predictive p value is a p value from a likelihood-ratio test under broad regularity conditions, which is closely related to the s value of Patriota (2013) .
